Emergencies Act report highlights intelligence failure by Ottawa police

A failure by the Ottawa Police Service (OPS) to properly assess intelligence gathered as numerous protest convoys converged on the capital, coupled with a "confused command and controlstructure" at the top of the organization, were major factors enabling and exacerbating the three-week occupation of the city last winter.

Those are among the findings in the final report of the Public Order Emergency Commission, tabled in Parliament on Friday afternoon.

"As the Freedom Convoy approached Ottawa, few within the OPS expected that demonstrators would remain for a protracted period. However, there was information available to the OPS that,properly assessed, would have told a different story," commissioner Paul Rouleau wrote in the report's executive summary, which spans more than 200 pages.

"Much of the disarray in Ottawa was a result of the OPS's incorrect belief regarding how long the protests would last."

In fact, according to Rouleau, the OPS had access to "multiple sources of intelligence" that together "showed that there was a strong possibility that the Ottawa protests would extend past the first weekend, contrary to what OPS command believed."

OPP intelligence reports largely ignored

Among those available intelligence sources was the Ontario Provincial Police-led Project Hendon, which first assessed the convoy protests in a report dated Jan. 13.

The earliest Hendon reportwarned "that protesters lacked an exit strategy after arriving in Ottawa, that hundreds of vehicles from numerous convoys were participating, and that individuals with fringe ideologies were joining the movement."

By Jan. 20, a week before the first trucks arrived in Ottawa, Project Hendon was warning that the protests had the potential to be disruptive, and that the anti-government, anti-vaccine mandate protesters couldstay until their demands were met.

The OPS had access to other sources of intelligence, including a warning from the local hotel association that protesters had inquired about booking rooms for as long as 90 days.

Still, "as the convoy approached Ottawa, no member of the OPS executive had access to a complete or accurate intelligence picture," Rouleau wrote.

Dysfunction at the top

Part of the problem existed at the top of the OPS, where Rouleau describes an atmosphere of distrust and dysfunction.

For example, while former chief Peter Sloly began receiving intelligence updates as early as Jan. 13, his deputy chiefs Steve Bell and Patricia Ferguson, who also testified at last fall'spublic hearings, didn't receive their first update until Jan. 20, and didn't see the Hendon reports until the day before the convoys arrived in Ottawa.

"The OPS lacked a system to ensure that intelligence reports were disseminated to the entire executive," Rouleau wrote, a situation that was allowed to continue "right up to the arrival of the convoy."

An OPS intelligence assessmentprepared by Sgt. Chris Kiezand made available on Jan. 25 "stressed that this event would be of an unprecedented scale," and noted protesters would "be able to stop and effectively shut down movement if they desire," however "other risks posed by the Freedom Convoy were not prominently featured" in the OPS assessment, according to Rouleau.

The commission also found that Insp. Russell Lucas, who was appointed incident commander on Jan. 21, "initially discounted the intelligence that the Freedom Convoy would remain in and disrupt Ottawa until its demands were met because it did not align with his experience of anti-vaccine protests by local truckers in 2020 and 2021."

As a result, Lucas concentrated his planning on traffic management, "which he identified as the principal risk posed by the convoy."(By Jan. 26, as better intelligence became available, Lucas "developed heightened concerns"about anti-government elements among the protesters and their intention to remain in Ottawa beyond the first weekend.)

This contributed to thedisconnect between the OPS operational plan and the available intelligence, but Rouleau found no one pointed out the discrepancy until it was too late.

City deferred to police

Nor did city officials appear to question the OPS plan to allow the protest vehicles to converge on Wellington Street, according to the report.

Sloly briefed former mayor Jim Watson and other top city officials about the coming convoys on Jan. 26, but Watson said after the meeting he still had no clear idea how many vehicles were about to descend on the city.

Nevertheless, "the City deferred to the OPS plan and did not use its authority under municipal bylaws to close roads to prevent the entry of vehicles into the downtown core."

Otherwise, "the City itself took few steps to prepare for the demonstrations," Rouleau wrote.

The OttawaPolice Services Board (OPSB), meanwhile, received "mixed" information about the anticipated size and nature of the protest.

On one hand, OPS was telling the board the protesters would likely disperse after the first weekend. But Ferguson also warned the board at a meetingon Jan. 26 of a "fluid" situation thatcould go on for an "extended period."

"The OPSB seemingly failed to raise this potential discrepancy at the [Jan. 26] meeting, despite its obvious importance," Rouleau wrote.

Nor did the board ever see an operational plan from the OPS. Rather, according to Rouleau, then chair Diane Deans "believed a plan was in place."

"The Board did not push for those details, and endorsed the general approach of facilitating the right to protest while protecting against loss of life and serious injury," according to the final report.

Police lacked contingency plans

Even after realizing the protest would be longer and more disruptivethan anticipated, the OPS "did not develop an overall operational plan to resolve the protests," Rouleau wrote.

That lack of swift police action gave the protesters the upper hand, allowing a core group to dig in and occupy the city's downtown.

"Without contingency plans, the operational plan counted on the best and did not plan for the worst," Rouleau wrote.

Those planning challenges were "compounded by a general breakdown of command and control" at the top of the OPS, where many of the key players were new to their roles.

The report also acknowledges the suffering of Ottawa residents throughout the occupation.

During the first week, honking was "almost constant, continuing throughout the day and, at times, into the night," Rouleau wrote.

"I heard credible reports of residents feeling threatened and being harassed by protesters," including some "physical altercations" when protesters tried to remove masks from passersby.

"Some individuals who lived in the area were too afraid to leave their homes. Vulnerable residents were particularly affected. These fears were compounded by the seeming inability of police to protect the public and preserve law and order."

OPS 'carefully reviewing'documents, new chief says

Ottawa police Chief EricStubbs told CBC Friday the OPS "acknowledges"it made mistakes during the protestand is"carefully reviewing the documents" inRouleau's report.

"We recognize the direct harms done to our residents and the downtown communities," Stubbssaid.

But Stubbs added theOPS hassince implemented "many of the proposed recommendations" in thereport.

He listed a strengthening of the service's intelligence sharing process, liaison team, incident command structureand inter-agency collaboration as steps Ottawa police havesince taken to address the mistakes of the convoy.

"Certainly, intelligence sharing, as the justice indicated, was a problem, so we agree with that conclusion," Stubbs said.

Situation 'could have been avoided'

Among the 56 recommendations contained in the commission's final report, Rouleau urges the federal government, alongside numerous stakeholders including local police agencies,to better co-ordinate the gathering and distribution of intelligence related to major events such as protests. That could involve the creation of a single national security co-ordinator.

Rouleau also recommends developing new protocolsfor requesting additional police resources in situations where the local police force finds itself overwhelmed, and that local police boards streamline their policies to better enable them to react to such situations.

In terms of the government's decision to invoke the Emergencies Act on Feb. 14, 2022,Rouleau found "the very high threshold for invocation was met."

However, he concludedthe situation in Ottawa "could have been avoided" had police been better prepared for what was coming.

"The response to the Freedom Convoy involved a series of policing failures" large and small that "contributed to a situation thatspun out of control.... Lawful protest descended into lawlessness, culminating in a national emergency."